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INTRODUCTION 
In his groundbreaking 1967 study, Privacy and Freedom, Alan Westin 
defined privacy as ―the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about 
them is communicated to others.‖
1
 Many data protection laws enacted since 
then have followed suit, relying on choice—often together with notice 
necessary to support choice—as the key tool for protecting privacy, or even as 
the goal of those laws. 
For example, the influential Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 
1980, provide that personal data should not be used for purposes other than 
those specified at the time the data were collected, except: ―(a) with the consent 
of the data subject; or (b) by the authority of law.‖
2
 
Additionally, the Data Protection Directive adopted by the European 
Union (EU) in 1995 is significantly focused on individual choice. According to 
the directive, data protection is achieved in part through ―the right conferred on 
individuals, the data on whom are the subject of processing, to be informed that 
processing is taking place, to consult the data, to request corrections and even 
to object to processing in certain circumstances.‖
3
 Article 7 of the directive 
provides seven conditions under which personal data may be processed. The 
first is when ―the data subject has unambiguously given his consent.‖
4
 Article 8 
restricts the processing of sensitive data, but then provides that the restriction 
shall not apply where ―the data subject has given his explicit consent to the 
 
1. ,  7 (1967). 
2.
 15 (1980), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_2649_34255_15589524_1_1_1_1,00. 
html.  
3. Council Directive 95/46, Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, Preamble ¶ 25, 1995 O.J. (L281) (EC), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber& 
lg=en&type_doc=Directive&an_doc=1995&nu_doc=46. 
4. Id. art. 7(a). 
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processing of those data.‖
5
 Finally, Article 26 identifies six exceptions to the 
provision prohibiting the export of personal data to non-European countries 
lacking ―adequate‖ data protection. The first is that ―the data subject has given 
his consent unambiguously to the proposed transfer.‖
6
 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Privacy Framework, 
adopted in 2004, is similarly focused on choice: ―Where appropriate, 
individuals should be provided with clear, prominent, easily understandable, 
accessible and affordable mechanisms to exercise choice in relation to the 
collection, use and disclosure of their personal information.‖
7
  
Professor Paul Schwartz has described the focus on individual choice 
reflected in these laws as ―privacy-control‖: ―From the age of computer 
mainframes in the 1960s to the current reign of the Internet’s decentralized 
networks, academics and the law have gravitated towards the idea of privacy as 
a personal right to control the use of one’s data.‖
8
 As a result, Schwartz 
concludes, ―[t]he conventional wisdom seeks to place the individual at the 
center of decisionmaking about personal information use by conceiving of 
privacy as a right of control over data use.‖
9
 Many privacy scholars agree, 
whether writing in the 1960s
10
 or the current millennium.
11
  
Nowhere is the focus on individual choice, and notice to facilitate that 
choice, more evident than in the United States. Beginning in the mid-1990s, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and state attorneys general encouraged U.S. 
operators of commercial websites to adopt and publish online privacy policies. 
Adoption of such policies was voluntary; compliance with them was not. The 
Commission interprets section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which 
empowers the FTC to prosecute ―unfair and deceptive‖ trade practices, to 
include violations of posted privacy policies.
12
 
 
 5. Id. art. 8(2)(a). 
 6. Id. art. 26(1)(a).  
 7. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Privacy Framework, 2004/AMM/014rev1 
(Nov. 2004), at 12, available at http://www.apec.org/apec/news___media/2004_media_releases/ 
201104_apecminsendorseprivacyfrmwk.MedialibDownload.v1.html?url=/etc/medialib/apec_medi
a_library/downloads/ministerial/annual/2004.Par.0015.File.v1.1. 
 8. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52  1607, 
1659 (1999).  
 9. Id. at 1660. 
10. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77  475, 482 (1968) (describing privacy as ―the 
control we have over information about ourselves‖). 
11. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52  1461, 1463 (2000) 
(describing privacy as ―the ability to control the acquisition or release of information about 
oneself‖); ,  70 (2010) (criticizing ―conceptions of 
privacy adopted in scholarship, law, and policy [that] incorporate control as a component of 
privacy, or, one might say, constitute privacy as a particular form of control‖). 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006); ,
 8–9 (2010) [hereinafter 
], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf. 
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In 1998, the FTC reported to Congress on what it believed a privacy 
policy must contain. After reviewing the ―fair information practice codes‖ of 
the United States, Canada, and Europe, the Commission concluded: ―Common 
to all of these documents . . . are five core principles of privacy protection,‖ the 
first two of which were ―Notice/Awareness‖ and ―Choice/Consent.‖
13
 
According to the Commission, ―[t]he most fundamental principle is notice. . . . 
[because] [w]ithout notice, a consumer cannot make an informed decision as to 
whether and to what extent to disclose personal information.‖
14
 The FTC 
continued, ―[t]he second widely-accepted core principle of fair information 
practice is consumer choice or consent . . . [over] how any personal information 
collected from them may be used.‖
15
 
U.S. statutes and regulations have tended to parallel the FTC’s choice-
based approach. For example, in 1999 Congress passed major financial privacy 
legislation as Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services 
Modernization Act.
16
 The law permits a financial institution to transfer any 
―nonpublic personal information‖ to nonaffiliated third parties only if the 
institution ―clearly and conspicuously‖ provides consumers with a notice about 
its information disclosure policies and an opportunity to opt out of such 
transfers.
17
 That notice must be sent at least annually even if there is no change 
in its terms.
 18
  
The Privacy Rule applicable to personal health information, adopted in 
2001 by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), provides a 
starker example.
19
 First, the rule permits a covered entity to use personal health 
information to provide, or obtain payment for, health care only after first 
providing the patient with notice and making a good faith effort to obtain an 
―acknowledgment.‖
20
 Second, for most purposes other than treatment or 
payment, a covered entity may use personal health information only with an 
individual’s opt-in ―authorization.‖
21
 Third, a covered entity may use or 
disclose personal health information for directories and to notify and involve 
other individuals in the care of a patient if the covered entity obtains the 
 
13. ,  7 (1998), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf. 
14. Id. at 7. 
15. Id. at 8 (citations omitted). 
16. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338 (1999). 
17. Id. §§ 502(b)(1), 503(b)(1)(B). 
18. See id. § 503(a). 
19. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,461 (Dec. 28, 2000) (as amended by 67 Fed. Reg. 53,181 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 
C.F.R. pt. 160, §§ 164.502, 164.506)).  
20. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a) (2009). 
21. Id. § 164.508(a)(1). 
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―agreement‖ of the individual.
22
 Thus, the health Privacy Rule well illustrates 
the centrality and growing complexity of notice and consent requirements: one 
rule to deal with one type of information requires the use of three different 
types of notice and consent. 
In fact, the focus on choice has done more to undermine—rather than to 
protect—individual privacy, and to diminish—rather than to maximize—
human welfare. The reasons this is true may be divided into two broad 
categories. The first includes objections relating to how choice works in 
practice. All of the available evidence suggests that notices are widely ignored 
by individuals and are written in overly broad or overly detailed language.
23
 As 
a result, individuals are not aware of—or do not understand—the choices 
available to them, or those choices are so broad or so frequent as to be 
meaningless.  
The second category includes objections to the concept of defining 
privacy as individual control and hinging its protection on decisions by 
individuals. Individual choice is not the same as personal privacy, so focusing 
laws, regulations, and enforcement on the former will not necessarily enhance 
the latter. As the Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on Health Research 
and the Privacy of Health Information wrote in 2009, ―consent (authorization) 
itself cannot achieve the separate aim of privacy protection.‖
24
 Moreover, the 
preoccupation with choice effectively shifts the burden for protecting privacy 
from the data user to the data subject. Choice can be a disservice to the 
individual, for example, when the individual injures his or her own interests 
through an uninformed or unwise choice. And there are many situations in 
which individual choice is outweighed by other interests of the individual or 
society. For example, we do not ask licensed professionals (such as airplane 
pilots or childcare workers) to agree to have their personal information 
collected and processed, yet this does not mean that they have no privacy 
interests in the subsequent reuse or disclosure of that information.  
In short, the control-based system of data protection is not working. The 
flurry of notices may give individuals some illusion of enhanced privacy, but 
the reality is far different. The result is the worst of all worlds: privacy 
protection is not enhanced, individuals pay the cost of bureaucratic laws, and 
we have become so enamored with notice and choice that we have failed to 
develop better alternatives. The situation only grows worse as new technologies 
and applications increase the supply of, and the demand for, personal 
information. 
 
22. Id. § 164.510. 
23. , supra note 12, at iii, 19–20. 
24.
 250 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12458. 
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In the specific context of using personal information for health research, 
both sets of objections—those relating to practical implementation and those 
relating to the fundamental concept of choice-based systems—are present.
25
 As 
a practical matter, it is very difficult to make a meaningful choice-based system 
work, and there are strong ethical objections to making life-saving health 
research depend on individual choice to use information.  
Rather than examine the limits of choice broadly as the dominant means 
of protecting privacy, as has been done before,
26
 this Article addresses those 
limits in the specific context of using personal information for health research. 
There are five reasons this is a particularly appropriate context in which to 
consider the role of choice. First, it is an area in which both the value and the 
limits of choice are particularly evident. Second, it is an area of great 
importance to individuals and society more broadly. Third, it is an area where 
there has been considerable recent and on-going attention as part of both the 
national debate over health care reform and multinational discussions about 
data protection reform. Fourth, in part because of that recent attention, it is an 
area in which society might be able to speak meaningfully about solutions—
that provide more ethical, and more efficient approaches to data protection than 
relying on individual choice. Finally, the analysis and problem-solving we 
bring to this area can provide useful guidance in other contexts. 
Part I of this Article briefly surveys the objections to relying on consumer 
choice for protecting privacy generally, before examining the role of individual 
choice in health research in particular. Part II provides an introduction to health 
research and its regulation. It discusses the expanding role of personal 
information, the ethical principles of autonomy and informed consent, and the 
primary federal regulation of health research—the Common Rule. Part III 
examines the Privacy Rule issued under HIPAA. Part IV considers the impact 
of the Privacy Rule and its consent requirement on both health research and 
personal privacy. Finally, Part V offers some tentative thinking about ways of 
improving the operation of consent, as well as alternatives to consent. 
This Article argues that an inappropriate reliance on individual choice 
concerning the use of personal information in health research has disserved 
both individuals and society. While many of the reasons are practical, and have 
to do with the difficulty and cost of obtaining any choice—whether positive or 
negative—there are substantial conceptual objections to relying so heavily on 
individual choice in this setting, including that it is unethical to do so. 
 
25. ―Research‖ is defined under both the Privacy Rule and the Common Rule as ―a 
systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to 
develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.‖ 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.102(d), 164.501 (2009). 
26. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in 
 343 (Jane K. Winn ed., 
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156972. 
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I. 
THE CRITIQUE OF CHOICE 
While focusing on choice, and mandatory notices to support individual 
choice, has long been a favored strategy of lawmakers, regulators, and privacy 
advocates, today there is mounting criticism that choice is, at minimum, 
insufficient and, in many cases, undesirable. A lengthy analysis of the broad 
critique of choice is beyond the scope of this Article, but a brief summary of 
those objections is useful to place the analysis of choice as applied to data 
protection in health research in broader context. 
A. Inaccessibility 
Notices are often inaccessible. Many notices in the United States are 
complex because the laws and business practices they describe are complex. 
Moreover, they often read like contracts because regulators have chosen to 
enforce them like contracts.
27
 eBay Vice President and General Counsel Kent 
Walker has written that notices often suffer from: 
 ―Overkill‖—―masses of unintelligible small print that no one 
bothers to read.‖
28
 
 ―Irrelevance‖—describing activities of so little concern to 
most consumers that it ―is like leading a satiated horse to 
unappealing water.‖
29
 
 ―Opacity‖—reflecting the ―bedrock truth . . . that it is difficult 
to track, let alone describe, all the information that is 
exchanged in a typical transaction, all the places that it is 
stored, and all the ways that it is used.‖
30
 
 ―Non-comparability‖—again reflecting an underlying reality 
that ―the simplification necessary for comparability comes at a 
significant cost in accuracy and flexibility.‖
31
 
 ―Inflexibility‖—failing to keep pace with ―new business 
models and new consumer demands.‖
32
 
The opposite is often seen under European data protection laws, which 
can reduce notices to mere warnings. One popular privacy notice throughout 
London and other European capitals is ―Warning: CCTV [Closed Circuit 
Television] in use.‖
33
 Such signs may motivate good behavior, but they do little 
 
27. See, e.g., In the Matter of Eli Lilly and Company, FTC File No. 012 3214, Docket No. 
C-4047, Complaint (May 10, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/elilillycmp.htm. 
28. Kent Walker, The Costs of Privacy, 25  87, 107 (2001). 
29. Id. at 108. 
30. Id. at 110. 
31. Id. at 111. 
32. Id. at 112. 
33. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Office, Public Workshop, CCTV: 
Developing Privacy Best Practices, Panel on Legal and Policy Perspectives, Arlington, VA, Dec. 
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to empower individuals to make informed choices about the collection and use 
of data about them. Neither approach—loading notices with exceptional detail 
or reducing notices to mere cigarette-pack-like warnings—has proved very 
informative or protective of privacy. 
B. Inadequate to Motivate Action 
Few people read notices or act on consent requests unless they are 
required to, in which case they almost always grant consent if necessary to get 
the service or product they want. As FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz noted at the 
first of the Commission’s three 2009–2010 Roundtables on Exploring Privacy: 
―We all agree that consumers don’t read privacy policies‖
34
—a remarkable 
acknowledgement from the U.S. federal agency that has probably done the 
most to promote them.  
In reality, this has long been the view of leaders of the FTC. The lack of 
consumer response to Gramm-Leach-Bliley financial privacy notices prompted 
then-FTC Chairman Timothy Muris to comment at the end of 2001: 
The recent experience with Gramm-Leach-Bliley privacy notices 
should give everyone pause about whether we know enough to 
implement effectively broad-based legislation based on notices. Acres 
of trees died to produce a blizzard of barely comprehensible privacy 
notices. Indeed, this is a statute that only lawyers could love—until 
they found out it applied to them.
35
 
The difficulties of reaching and provoking a response from consumers are 
exacerbated where the party wishing to use the information has no (and may 
not have ever had) direct contact with the consumer. For example, most mailing 
lists are obtained from third parties.
36
 To require the purchaser of a list to 
contact every person individually to obtain consent to use the names and 
addresses on the list would cause delay, require additional contacts with 
consumers, and almost certainly prove prohibitively expensive. And it could 
not be done without using the very information that the list purchaser is seeking 
consent to use. 
C. The Absence of Choice 
Notices often merely disclose the absence of choice. For example, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley financial privacy provisions, under which Congress 
 
18, 2007 (statement of Fred H. Cate), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/ 
privacy_workshop_cctv_Transcript_Legal_and_Policy_Perspectives_Panel.pdf. 
34. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Introductory Remarks at the FTC 
Privacy Roundtable (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/ 
091207privacyremarks.pdf. 
35. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Privacy 2001 
Conference (Oct. 4, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002.shtm. 
36. ,  34–73 (2005). 
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requires that financial institutions send notices to customers annually even if 
there has been no change in the institution’s privacy practices, in fact require 
just one consumer choice: consumers can opt out of some, but not all, transfers 
of personal information to third parties for marketing purposes.
37
 As a practical 
matter, therefore, consumers’ only serious choice in response to the notices is 
to choose to take their business elsewhere, assuming there is another financial 
institution that discloses preferable data processing practices. 
D. The Illusion of Choice 
Notice and choice opportunities are often so broad as to make choice 
meaningless. Schwartz has noted: ―One’s clicking through a consent screen to 
signify surrendering of her personal data for all future purposes is an example of 
both uninformed consent and a bad bargain.‖
38
 Similarly, when choice is offered for 
a service or product that cannot be provided without personal information, 
individuals are afforded the illusion—but not the reality—of choice. 
European data protection regulators have addressed this issue in the 
context of employers asking employees to consent to the collection and use of 
personal information. The Article 29 Working Party, made up of the national 
data protection commissioners from each of the twenty-seven EU member 
states, has expressed the view that where ―consent is required from a worker, 
and there is a real or potential relevant prejudice that arises from not 
consenting, the consent is not valid.‖
39
 The Working Party has made this point 
repeatedly: ―If it is not possible for the worker to refuse it is not consent.‖
40
 
―Consent must at all times be freely given. Thus a worker must be able to 
withdraw consent without prejudice.‖
41
 As a result of these views, consent is 
rarely a basis for data processing in employment contexts in Europe; processing 
must be justified on some basis other than consumer choice. 
E. Inadequate Privacy Protection 
Individual choice is not the same thing as privacy protection and merely 
providing choice does not necessarily enhance privacy protection. Choice—and 
notice to support choice—have tended to become a distraction from, or even a 
substitute for, more meaningful privacy protections. As a result, the energy of 
data processors, legislators, and enforcement authorities is often expended on 
notices and choice opportunities, rather than on enhancing privacy. Compliance 
 
37. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 
502(b)(2), (e), 113 Stat. 1338, 1437, 1438 (1999). 
38. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1678. 
39. Article 29 Working Party Opinion on the Processing of Personal Data in the 
Employment Context, at 23, WP 48 (Sept. 13, 2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/ 
policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2001/wp48en.pdf.  
40. Id.  
41. Id. 
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with data protection laws is often focused on providing required notices in 
proper form at the right time and acting on choices, rather than on ensuring that 
personal information is protected.  
Data breach notification laws are an unfortunate, but timely, example. 
Beginning with California in 2002, forty-three states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted security breach legislation.
42
 These laws all have in 
common the requirement that institutions suffering breaches of personal 
information must notify the individuals whose data are involved. Now the 
United Kingdom,
43
 Canada,
44
 New Zealand,
45
 Australia,
46
 and other countries 
are considering similar laws. But notices only respond to breaches; they do not 
prevent them. Moreover, while notices may appear to give recipients choices, 
in reality they do not, since there is not much that individuals can do after the 
breach has occurred. Yet regulators and legislators have flocked to breach 
notice laws, thus diverting government, industry, and public attention away 
from more pressing security threats—such as malicious code and increasingly 
sophisticated behavioral attacks—and more effective measures for preventing 
harm.
47
  
Notice after the fact is too modest a response if we think data breaches 
pose serious security threats, and too burdensome a response if we think they 
do not. Accordingly, a privacy policy based on individual choice often provides 
too little protection for privacy, unless we think there is virtually no risk at all, 
in which case it is imposing unnecessary burdens on individuals and 
institutions alike. 
 
42. For up-to-date information on state security breach laws, see State Security Breach 
Notification Laws, , 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).  
43. Information Commissioner’s Office of the United Kingdom, Guidance on Data 
Security Breach Management (Mar. 27, 2008), available at http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/ 
documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/guidance_on_data_security_breach_mana
gement.pdf.  
44. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Key Steps for Organizations in 
Responding to Privacy Breaches (Aug. 28, 2007), available at http://www.privcom.gc.ca/ 
information/guide/2007/gl_070801_02_e.asp.  
45. Privacy Commissioner of New Zealand, Key Steps for Agencies in Responding to 
Privacy Breaches and Privacy Breach Checklist (Feb. 2008), available at http://privacy.org.nz/ 
assets/Files/Privacy-Breach-Guidelines/Privacy-breach-guidelines-key-steps.February-2008.doc; 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of New Zealand, Information Paper to Accompany Privacy 
Breach Guidance Material (Feb. 2008), available at www.privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/560990.doc. 
46. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of the Australian Government, Consultation Paper: 
Draft Voluntary Information Security Breach Notification Guide (Apr. 2008), available at 
http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/breach_0408.pdf.  
47. See ,
 2 (2008), available at http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/ 
FileUpload265/2308/Information_Security_Breaches_Cate.pdf. 
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F. False Dichotomy 
The preoccupation with choice often sets up an artificial dichotomy 
between personally identifiable information and non-personally identifiable 
information. While businesses are forced to ask about the use of specific 
information defined by laws and regulations as personally identifiable, 
thousands of other potentially identifying data elements are ignored entirely. 
For example, while collecting (or disclosing) names and addresses may be 
conditioned on consumer choice, no such requirement applies to other data 
points, such as browser choice and font size, even though when enough of these 
are linked they provide an accurate, unique online identifier.
48
 A 2009 study in 
the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences demonstrates that Social 
Security Numbers can actually be predicted from publicly available 
information about many citizens.
49
 Efforts to distinguish between personally 
identifiable and non-personally identifiable information ignore the reality that 
the highly interconnected nature of the Internet, and the vast and growing 
volume of data found there, make even the most innocuous-seeming 
information capable of being linked to an identified individual.  
G. Burden on the Individual 
Linking privacy to individual choice can impose significant burdens on 
individuals, particularly as the volume and pace of data flows increase. Choice-
based data protection systems have the effect of shifting the burden for 
protecting privacy from the data user to the data subject, yet few individuals 
have the time, knowledge, or interest to make all of those choices about data 
collection and use. To take just one example, consumer credit reports in the 
United States are updated with an average of 4.5 billion pieces of data per 
month.
50
 How many people want to be asked to consent each time? Yet how 
meaningful is consent if it must be given or withheld for all updates as a group?  
We know how consistently individuals ignore notices—not just related to 
privacy, but including copyright notices when downloading software, 
disclosure terms when opening financial accounts, and informed consent 
notices for medical treatments.
51
 As a result, individuals may be making 
significant choices when they are not aware that they are making any at all. Or 
 
48. See Jeremy Kirk, EFF: Browsers Can Leave a Unique Trail on the Web, , 
Jan. 29, 2010, available at http://www.pcworld.com/article/188134/eff_browsers_can_ 
leave_a_unique_trail_on_the_web.html. For a practical demonstration visit , 
https://panopticlick.eff.org/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).  
49. Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Predicting Social Security Numbers from Public 
Data, 106 10975 (2009).  
50. FAQs, How Accurate Is the Information in a Credit Report?, 
, http://www.cdiaonline.org/ConsumerInfo/content.cfm?ItemNumber= 
875 (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).  
51. Fred H. Cate, ―The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles,‖ in 
,  341, 358–360 (2006). 
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they may make the choices they are forced into in order to obtain products and 
services they want. For example, how many consumers have ever read an 
intellectual property pop-up notice when attempting to download data or 
software? Yet in a choice-based system, those decisions can have serious 
consequences, such as assuming liability or waiving legal protections, even 
though we know they were made reflexively, without thought, or maybe not at 
all. Notice and choice do not protect us from our own bad, ignorant, 
unintentional, or unavoidable choices. Contrast choice in privacy with other 
types of consumer protection laws: under U.S. law, a consumer cannot consent 
to be defrauded, but she can consent to have her privacy violated.
52
 
H. The Cost of Providing Choice 
The cost of providing choice can be considerable. It can include the 
financial cost of creating, printing, and mailing billions of notices each year, as 
well as the mechanisms for recording consumer choices. This cost also includes 
the consequences of obtaining and acting on choice.
53
 For example, under the 
EU Data Protection Directive, a business may transfer personal data out of the 
EU to a country, such as the United States, that lacks ―adequate‖ data 
protection only under five conditions.
54
 One of those conditions is 
―unambiguous consent‖ by the data subject.
55
 What does a business relying on 
consent do if one customer objects: Build a separate data center in Europe? 
Refuse to do business with that customer? Choices have real consequences that 
impose real costs on individuals and institutions.  
I. Government Access to Personal Data Unaffected 
Notice and choice do not restrict government access to personal 
information, which may very well be the greatest and fastest-growing threat to 
personal liberty today. For instance, the government does not seek consent 
before requiring individuals to file taxes, obtain licenses, or register for 
government benefits.
56
 It does not check with data subjects before intercepting 
 
52. See Cate, supra note 26, at 374. 
53. See id. at 364. 
54. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 3, art. 25–26. 
55. Id. art. 26(1)(a). The European Data Protection Supervisor describes the following 
requirements for ―unambiguous consent‖: ―Before a data subject can be considered to freely have 
given consent to a specific processing operation, he or she must receive sufficient information to 
be able to understand the scope and consequences of consent, including the advantages and/or 
disadvantages of the processing.‖ Legitimate Reasons for Processing of Personal Data, 
, http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/ 
Dataprotection/QA/QA6 (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).  
56. See Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals in the Hands of Government: 
Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4  455, 456 
(1995) (―[C]itizens cannot pay taxes without at the same time providing the government with 
quite detailed information about their families, jobs, investments, misfortunes, and favorite 
charities.‖).  
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telephone calls, email messages, and other communications.
57
 As the 
government has expanded its collection of personal data from the private 
sector, it does not pause to ask for individual permission before requiring 
employers, financial institutions, airlines, telephone companies, and thousands 
of other businesses to disclose billions of customer records to the government 
each year.
58
 Moreover, the government does not care what choices the 
regulated businesses have offered their customers.
59
 It is no defense, when the 
government comes calling, to say ―We promised our customers and employees 
that we would respect their privacy by not giving the government their personal 
data.‖ So, in fact, many of the so-called ―privacy choices‖ that individuals are 
asked to make are misleading, because while they may purport to offer 
individuals some right in nondisclosure, government demands trump that right.  
J. Choice As a Disservice to Individuals 
Finally, choice can actually interfere with engaging in an activity of great 
value to individuals or society more broadly. Consider information about 
individuals’ creditworthiness: its value derives from the fact that the 
information is obtained routinely, over time, from sources other than the 
consumer. Allowing the consumer to block use of unfavorable information 
would make the credit report useless. In the words of former FTC Chairman 
Timothy Muris, the credit reporting system ―works because, without anybody’s 
consent, very sensitive information about a person’s credit history is given to 
the credit reporting agencies. If consent were required, and consumers could 
decide—on a creditor-by-creditor basis—whether they wanted their 
information reported, the system would collapse.‖
60
  
In sum, individual choice as a basis for the use of personal data presents 
many challenges. Some of those concern the difficulties of making choice 
work: the inaccessibility of consent opportunities and notices, their inadequacy 
to provoke individuals to take action, the limited opportunities they often 
provide, and the considerable costs that choice can impose. But many of the 
challenges reflect fundamental objections to reliance on individual choice at all. 
These include when the choice is illusory, when choice substitutes for more 
meaningful privacy protection, when choice creates a false dichotomy between 
personally identifiable and non-personally identifiable information, when 
choice imposes an impossible burden on individuals, when choice leaves 
sensitive personal information exposed to government surveillance, and when 
 
57. See Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 6, 
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., No. C-06-0672-JCS (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2006), available at 
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/att_complaint_amended.pdf. 
58. See Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 
 435 (2008). 
59. See id. 
60. Muris, supra note 35.  
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choice actively disserves the best interests of individuals. These same 
objections are true of choices concerning the use of health data in medical 
research, the context on which the remainder of this Article is focused.  
II. 
HEALTH RESEARCH AND ITS REGULATION 
A. The Role of Personal Data in Health Research 
Healthcare today is increasingly information driven. It was this realization 
that was much of the impetus behind the passage of HIPAA—to provide for the 
digitization and standardization of health records necessary to enhance 
efficiency, accountability, and transferability of those records.
61
  
However, in the fourteen years since HIPAA was passed, personal 
information has assumed even greater importance, especially in health research. 
For example, a growing volume of research no longer involves experimenting 
on patients and research subjects. Rather, this research focuses on reviewing 
data about actual experience with treatments and drug therapies in order to 
detect harmful side effects, to better understand the operation of medicines, to 
develop new treatments, and to spot unanticipated benefits and uses for drug 
therapies. In addition, retrospective studies—research that relies on existing 
data about previous medical experiences—are playing a rapidly growing role in 
medical research as more data about medical experiences become available in 
digital, structured form. Finally, major new databases have been created to 
facilitate research concerning cancer (e.g., the Cancer Biomedical Informatics 
Grid), patients requiring circulation support (e.g., the Interagency Registry for 
Mechanically Assisted Circulatory Support), failing organ systems (e.g., the 
Extracorporeal Life Support Organization), and organ transplantation (e.g., the 
United Network for Organ Sharing), to name just a few.
62
 
1. Information-Based Health Research 
The increased use of personal information in health research has been 
found to have many advantages. In 2009, the IOM published the report of its 
Committee on Health Research and the Privacy of Health Information.
63
 
According to that report, the advantages of information-based health research 
include that: 
 it is often faster and less expensive than experimental studies;  
 it can analyze very large sets of data; 
 it may detect unexpected phenomena or differences among 
 
61. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 
261, 110 Stat. 1936, 2021. 
62. , supra note 24, at 116–18. 
63. See id. 
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subpopulations that might not be included in a controlled 
experimental study;  
 it can often be undertaken when controlled trials are simply 
not possible for ethical, technical, or other reasons; 
 it can be used to study effectiveness of a specific test or 
intervention in clinical practice, rather than just the efficacy as 
determined by a controlled experimental study; 
 it can also reexamine data accrued in other research studies, 
such as clinical trials, to answer new questions quickly and 
inexpensively.
64
 
Reliable, accessible patient data are also critical for finding appropriate 
research subjects for experimental research and for developing appropriate 
research designs and protocols. The inability to identify and locate appropriate 
research subjects is a significant contributor to delaying the approval of new 
drugs. As the IOM committee noted: ―Many research studies, especially those 
focused on rare conditions with limited eligible patient populations, rely on 
large-scale medical chart reviews and searches of patient databases to identify 
patients who might be eligible for and might benefit from a particular study.‖
65
  
For example, when Eli Lilly was developing inhalable insulin, one 
potential concern was how the therapy would be tolerated by people with 
asthma or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease—the leading cause of death, 
illness, and disability in the United States.
66
 Conducting the research necessary 
to answer those questions required the difficult task of locating insulin-
dependent diabetics with asthma or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease who 
are not on inhaler therapy. In the case of chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, it also required locating diabetics who had never smoked—a near-
impossibility, given that smoking is a major contributor to chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease.
67
 Access to patient records was critical to accomplishing 
this.  
2. Personalized Medicine and Genetic Analysis 
Information-based research is also critical to the development of 
personalized medicine. Personalized medicine ―tailor[s] prevention strategies 
and treatments to each individual based on his/her genetic composition and 
health history.‖
68
 For example, pharmacogenomics—the science of tailoring 
drug therapies to specific genetic make-ups—is a major and growing focus of 
 
64. Id. at 118. 
65. Id. at 42. 
66. , , 
 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.hhs.state.ne.us/menshealth/copdfaq1.pdf.  
67. Id.  
68. , supra note 24, at 119.  
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the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), pharmaceutical companies, and 
medical researchers.
69
 The goal is to create drugs, determine dosage and 
therapies, and prevent harmful and even life-threatening reactions, all based on 
human genotype.
70
  
It sounds very futuristic, but it is happening already. In 2007, the FDA 
approved its first drug labeling requirement that specifically includes a warning 
for people with a specific genotype.
71
 The drug affected by this labeling 
requirement is the blood thinner Coumadin (warfarin).
72
 While it is a lifesaver 
for tens of millions of people who take it to prevent blood clots, heart attacks, 
and strokes, for about one-third of patients with a distinct variation of two 
genes, the drug can cause life-threatening internal bleeding.
73
 In fact, it is the 
second most common drug—after insulin—implicated in visits to emergency 
rooms for adverse drug events.
74
 The new labeling requirement warns patients 
and physicians about this genetic sensitivity. However, for patients to benefit 
from these advances, physicians must have access to individual genetic 
information to identify which patients are at risk. 
In short, many life-saving treatments also have the potential to kill or 
harm. Genetic research is already helping researchers identify at-risk patients 
so that they can receive alternative treatments. For example, patients with two 
copies of the gene for an abnormal clotting factor face a 50 to 100 times greater 
risk of developing blood clots in the leg than the general population.
75
 
Physicians use this information when caring for patients who may be 
immobilized for a substantial period, such as following major surgery.
76
 
Genetic analysis is also becoming part of standard care for treatment of 
many cancers. These analyses are used both to diagnose the disease and to 
determine responsiveness to treatment therapies. In 2006, Jonathan B. Perlin, 
former Undersecretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, testified before 
Congress that ―[c]ancer screening based on molecular genetic and proteomic 
tests identifies the disease earlier in many patients, giving us the opportunity to 
save many patients who, in fact, once could not be cured.‖
77
 
 
69. Department of Energy, Human Genome Project Information, Pharmacogenomics, 
available at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/medicine/pharma.shtml. 
70. Id. 
71. FDA Updates Labeling for Blood-thinners Coumadin and Warfarin, 
, Aug. 20, 2007. 
72. See id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Department of Veterans’ Affairs Medical and Prosthetic Research Program: Oversight 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 109th Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of Jonathan 
B. Perlin, Undersecretary for Health, Department of Veterans’ Affairs), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=f:28125 
.pdf. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 7.  
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The goal is to give ―the appropriate drug, at the appropriate dose, to the 
appropriate patient, at the appropriate time.‖
78
 However, genetic treatment 
therapies that focus on smaller and smaller subsets of the population make it 
difficult for researchers to find a large enough research population with one 
distinct genotype. Access to large amounts of personal data is essential to 
identify genetic patterns and to determine who should receive a genotype-based 
therapy. Access is also necessary to identify and recruit research subjects that 
meet ever more specific and hard-to-satisfy criteria. Thanks to remarkable 
advances in the study of genetics, and in information technologies necessary to 
collect and aggregate information about individuals’ genetic markers, 
researchers are moving closer to achieving this goal. But doing so requires 
reliable access to personal information. 
3. Data-Based Health Research 
Data-based health research will also expand as more patient data becomes 
available in digital format, especially through the growth of Electronic Health 
Records (EHRs). EHRs are a major focus of the 2004 initiative, launched by 
President Bush and expanded by President Obama, to promote health 
information technology.
79
 This initiative, overseen by the National Coordinator 
for Health Information Technology in the Department of Health and Human 
Services, seeks to lower health care costs, reduce medical errors, improve 
quality of care, and provide better information for patients and physicians.
80
 
These efforts include the distribution of $19.2 billion in grants and incentives 
for the development and adoption of health information technology and new 
requirements for the use of EHRs as a condition of receiving Medicare and 
Medicaid reimbursement.
81
 The ultimate goal is to make virtually all patient 
information available electronically, which may be readily accessed by health 
care providers irrespective of physical location.
82
  
This collection of digital records holds tremendous promise for data-based 
health research. As of 2009, 17 percent of U.S. physicians and approximately 8 
to 10 percent of U.S. hospitals used EHRs.
83
 As these figures grow, an 
 
78. , supra note 24, at 119. 
79. Michael D. Rosenthal, Electronic Health Records: A Boom or Bust for Venture 
Investors?,  1 (Spring 2010) (noting that ―the Obama and Bush 
administrations have put great emphasis on the development of an integrated national electronic 
health record (EHR) system‖), available at http://www.snrdenton.com/news__insights/ 
publications/idoc.ashx?docid=edaaa0dc-89be-4106-a9e9-c7bfdaf00ed9&version=-1. 
80. President George W. Bush, Exec. Order No. 13335, 69 Fed. Reg. 24,059 (Apr. 27, 
2004).  
81. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 4102, 123 
Stat. 115, 467. 
82. Id. 
83. David Blumenthal, The Federal Role in Promoting Health Information Technology 
, Jan. 2009, available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/ 
Content/Publications/Perspectives-on-Health-Reform-Briefs/2009/Jan/The-Federal-Role-in- 
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extraordinary volume of structured, digital data will potentially be available for 
analysis by researchers, thus expanding the range of studies that can be 
conducted using data on actual patient experience alone, without any testing or 
additional burden on patients.
84
  
Moreover, valuable personal health data are increasingly generated and 
used outside of traditional healthcare institutions. The rise of cheap, mobile, 
and pervasive computing technologies that allow continuous, instant, and 
ubiquitous access to information is facilitating a new paradigm in which 
technology pushes healthcare delivery out of the clinical setting and into 
patients’ everyday lives. PDAs, cell phones, and other ―non-medical‖ devices 
are increasingly used to provide an astonishing array of health data that can 
provide tailored healthcare at a lower cost and empower patients and their 
families to manage their health more effectively.
85
 These devices can be used to 
improve healthcare delivery by providing patient-specific information, giving 
individuals access to their own health data, helping them interpret those data, 
supporting communication between themselves and their providers, making 
people aware of their everyday health behaviors, and supporting healthy 
behavior changes. Individuals are also demonstrating a growing fascination 
with ―personal health records‖ (PHRs), which allow them to record health 
information such as blood pressure, weight, and exercise.
86
  
In addition, portable and home healthcare devices—pacemakers, 
continuous positive airway pressure machines, home dialysis systems, and the 
like—generate a wealth of real-world, digital data. For example, 200,000 
diabetics wear insulin pumps that continuously record blood glucose.
87
 Patients 
upload that information to manufacturer-provided websites for making 
individual treatment decisions.
88
 This information—already being recorded and 
stored in digital form—would be valuable for assessing the progress of diabetes 
and recommending better treatments. In our increasingly technology-rich 
society, many people generate and access recorded data in their everyday lives 
that are critical for their own care. Ensuring researchers have access to such 
individual health information could be invaluable for the treatment of patients 
with similar health profiles, as well as for research into new treatments. 
 
Promoting-Health-Information-Technology.aspx. 
84. See generally Caitlyn Ross, Stimulus Bill Funds Overdue Changes to U.S. Health Care 
Technology, 37  385 (2009). 
85. Mobile HealthCare Applications Represent the Next Frontier in the Life Sciences 
Industry,  (Dec. 14, 2010).  
86. Janice L. Clarke, Deborah C. Meiris & David B. Nash, Electronic Personal Health 
Records Come of Age, 21  5S–15S (3 Supp. 2006). 
87. Richard M. Bergenstal et al., Effectiveness of Sensor-Augmented Insulin-Pump Therapy 
in Type 1 Diabetes, 363  311 (2010); Diabetes Monitor—Q&A About Pump 
Therapy,  (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.diabetesmonitor.com/b46.htm.  
88. See, e.g., , , (2008), 
http://www.minimed.com/pdf/carelink_personal_getting_started_guide.pdf. 
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In sum, personal information is vital for health research. It plays a rapidly 
expanding role in retrospective studies, research subject identification, research 
protocol development, genetic research and personalized medicine, the 
evolution of EHRs and PHRs, and cutting edge research based on 
nontraditional, real-world data. Obtaining access to these valuable data is often 
a challenge for researchers, however, because of confusion between the norms 
and legal rules that apply to traditional research and those appropriate for data-
based research.  
B. Autonomy and Informed Consent 
Individual autonomy— ―signif[ying] control of decision-making and other 
activity by the individual‖
89
—lies at the heart of modern health care and health 
law, especially in the United States. This has not always been the case in all 
countries, and as we move increasingly to a system in which health care is not 
only paid for by third parties, but actually managed by them as well, it is not 
clear that it will continue to be the case in the United States. But for the 
moment, autonomy is the bedrock of medical practice and research. As Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo asserted in 1914: ―Every human being of adult years and 
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.‖
90
 
The obvious corollary of autonomy is informed consent. If individuals 
have the right to control what is done with their bodies, they must certainly 
have the right to be told what the options are and the potential risks and 
benefits of each. Professor LeBlang wrote that ―[i]nformed consent is . . . a core 
concept central to American beliefs about individual rights and the proper 
relationship between patients and providers.‖
91
  
In 1979, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects 
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research clearly extended the obligation to 
provide informed consent to researchers.
92
 In its final report, The Belmont 
Report, the Commission identified three overarching principles applicable to 
research involving human subjects: respect for persons, beneficence, and 
justice.
93
 According to the report, ―respect for persons‖ includes the ―ethical 
conviction‖ that ―individuals should be treated as autonomous agents.‖
94
 The 
report noted that ―[a]n autonomous person is an individual capable of 
 
89. Bart J. Collopy, Autonomy in Long Term Care: Some Crucial Distinctions, 28 
 10 (Supp. 1988). 
90. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 129 (N.Y. 1914). 
91. Theodore R. LeBlang et al., Informed Consent to Medical and Surgical Treatment, in 
 343, 349 (6th ed. 2004).  
92. See 
, , 
 (1979) [hereinafter 
], available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 4.  
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deliberation about personal goals and of acting under the direction of such 
deliberation. To respect autonomy is to give weight to autonomous persons’ 
considered opinions and choices while refraining from obstructing their actions 
unless they are clearly detrimental to others.‖
95
 
In the health research context, the key manifestation of respect for persons 
is informed consent. According to The Belmont Report, ―Respect for persons 
requires that subjects, to the degree that they are capable, be given the 
opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen to them. This opportunity 
is provided when adequate standards for informed consent are satisfied.‖
96
 
C. The Common Rule 
The Belmont Report’s recommendations are reflected in regulations that 
have been adopted by eighteen federal agencies and are known as the Common 
Rule.
97
 The Common Rule governs most federally funded research conducted 
on human beings and, as discussed below, establishes the basic requirements 
applicable to almost all research on human subjects in the United States.
98
 The 
Common Rule includes three basic requirements aimed at protecting research 
subjects: ―a review of proposed research by an Institutional Review Board 
(IRB), the informed consent of research subjects, and institutional assurances of 
compliance with the regulations.‖
99
 
Meaningful informed consent is one cornerstone of human subjects’ 
protections. To provide informed consent, a potential research subject must 
both understand what participation in a study entails (be ―informed‖), and agree 
to participate (―consent‖). The Common Rule requires that a researcher obtain 
informed consent, usually in writing, from a living person or their legally 
authorized representative before the person can be admitted to a study.
100
 The 
Common Rule also requires that researchers provide human subjects with 
 
 95. Id. at 5.  
 96. Id. at 10.  
 97. Protection of Human Subjects Rule, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2009). Departments and 
agencies adopting the Common Rule include: the Department of Health and Human Services, 
Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, Department of Defense, Consumer Product Safety Commission, International 
Development Cooperation Agency (Agency for International Development), Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of 
Education, Department of Veterans’ Affairs, Environmental Protection Agency, National Science 
Foundation, and Department of Transportation. The Common Rule applies to the Central 
Intelligence Agency by Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), and the 
Social Security Administration by Social Security Independence and Improvement Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464. The Office of Science and Technology Policy signed but did 
not codify the Common Rule, because it does not conduct clinical research. ,
, ,  6 
n.5 (2005), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32909.pdf. 
 98. See , supra note 97, at 1.  
  99. Id. 
100. Id. 
Cate.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete) 1/25/2011  4:11 PM 
2010] PROTECTING PRIVACY IN HEALTH RESEARCH 1785 
extensive information when seeking their consent to participate in research.
101
 
IRBs generally have the responsibility of ensuring the adequacy of 
informed consent and overseeing research involving human subjects. IRBs 
generally review and must approve (or disapprove) federally funded research 
on human subjects. IRBs must meet certain structural and membership 
requirements, including having at least five members with different expertise, 
at least one of whom is not affiliated with the investigator’s institution.
102
 For 
proposed research to be approved under the Common Rule, an IRB must find 
that numerous requirements are satisfied, including that ―informed consent is 
sought from each subject‖ and ―when appropriate, there are adequate 
provisions to protect the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality 
of data.‖
103
 For certain types of research, the Common Rule permits evaluation 
under ―expedited review,‖ which usually means review only by the chair of the 
IRB.
104
  
Although the Common Rule applies only to federally funded research, 
institutions receiving federal support for any nonexempt human subjects 
research must provide a ―Federalwide Assurance‖ to the federal government 
 
101. Researchers must provide subjects with: 
 a statement that the study involves research, an explanation of the purposes 
of the research and the expected duration of the subject’s participation, a 
description of the procedures to be followed, and identification of any 
procedures which are experimental; 
 a description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the 
subject; 
 a description of any benefits to the subject or to others which may reasonably 
be expected from the research; 
 a disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of treatment, if 
any, that might be advantageous to the subject; 
 a statement describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality of records 
identifying the subject will be maintained; 
 for research involving more than minimal risk, an explanation as to whether 
any compensation and an explanation as to whether any medical treatments 
are available if injury occurs and, if so, what they consist of, or where further 
information may be obtained; 
 an explanation of whom to contact for answers to pertinent questions about 
the research and research subjects’ rights, and whom to contact in the event 
of a research-related injury to the subject; and 
 a statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will involve 
no penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled, and 
the subject may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss 
of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled. 
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (2009). 
102. Id. § 46.107. 
103. Id. § 46.111. 
104. Id. § 46.110. To qualify for expedited review, projects must either fit within categories 
defined by the Secretary of HHS and involve ―no more than minimal risk,‖ id., or involve only 
―minor changes in previously approved research during the period (of one year or less) for which 
approval is authorized.‖ , supra note 97, at 4. The Common Rule defines ―minimal risk‖ 
as that in which ―the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research 
are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the 
performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.‖ 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i). 
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providing information about how they comply with the Common Rule.
105
 In its 
Federalwide Assurance, an institution may ―voluntarily extend the Common 
Rule or 45 CFR part 46 to all research regardless of the source of support.‖
106
 
In fact, many research institutions voluntarily comply in order to avoid 
situations in which one institution conducts federally funded research according 
to one set of rules and ethical principles and other research according to 
different rules and principles.
107
 Furthermore, although the decision to apply 
the Common Rule more broadly is voluntary, once it is included in an 
institution’s Federalwide Assurance, it becomes binding.
108
  
To summarize, under the principle of autonomy, which is the bedrock of 
U.S. health law, and under the Common Rule, which governs most research 
involving humans, health research on human subjects requires the informed 
consent of the research subjects. The researchers and the IRB overseeing the 
research must also ensure that ―there are adequate provisions to protect the 
privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of data.‖
109
 
III. 
THE PRIVACY RULE  
Health privacy is protected at the federal level in the United States by the 
Privacy Rule (the Rule) that HHS issued in 2001 under HIPAA.
110
 This Part 
discusses the details of the Privacy Rule and analyzes the burdens it imposes on 
health research, in light of the critique of choice made in Part I. Although the 
Privacy Rule offers three different options for researchers seeking to gain 
access to personal health information, none of these mechanisms has proved 
workable in practice. 
A. Basic Requirements 
As amended in 2002 and again in 2009,
111
 the Rule regulates the use of 
information that identifies, or reasonably could be used to identify, an 
individual and that relates to physical or mental health, the provision of health 
care to an individual, or payment for health care.
112
 The Rule applies to 
 
105. Office for Human Research Protections Federalwide Assurance Frequently Asked 
Questions, ,
[hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions], http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/FWAfaq.html (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2010).  
106. Id. 
107. Id. A complete list of all Federalwide Assurances is available at 
http://ohrp.cit.nih.gov/search/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).  
108. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 105.  
109. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7).  
110. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, §§ 164.502, 164.506). 
111. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 
53,181 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).  
112. 45 C.F.R. § 164.504. 
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―covered entities,‖ namely, anyone who provides or pays for health care in the 
normal course of business.
113
 
A covered entity may use personal health information to provide, or 
obtain payment for, health care only after first providing the patient with notice 
and making a good faith effort to obtain an ―acknowledgment.‖
114
 Notices must 
meet detailed requirements set forth in the Rule. For example, proof of 
providing notice and acknowledgments must be retained for six years after the 
date on which service is last provided.
115
 
For most purposes other than treatment or payment, a covered entity may 
use personal health information only with an individual’s opt-in 
―authorization.‖
116
 An ―authorization‖ must be provided by obtaining an 
independent document that specifically identifies the information to be used or 
disclosed, the purposes of the use or disclosure, the person or entity to whom a 
disclosure may be made, and other information.
117
 A covered entity may not 
require an individual to sign an authorization as a condition of receiving 
treatment or participating in a health plan.
118
 Furthermore, a covered entity may 
use or disclose personal health information for directories only if the covered 
entity obtains the ―agreement‖ of the individual.
119
 An agreement need not be 
written, provided that the individual is informed in advance of the use and has 
the opportunity to opt out of any disclosure.
120
  
Despite its many restrictions on the use of personal information, the 
federal Privacy Rule is only the minimum required regulation. States are free to 
adopt more stringent protections,
121
 including a law that  
prohibits or restricts a use or disclosure in circumstances that would be 
permitted under HIPAA; . . . provides an individual with a greater 
amount of information regarding disclosure, rights, and remedies; . . . 
narrows the scope or duration of any legal permission to use PHI 
[protected health information], or increases the privacy protections 
afforded to PHI; . . . [or] provides greater privacy protection for the 
individual with respect to any other matter.
122
  
While the federal health Privacy Rule marks the apex of choice-based U.S. 
privacy law and the growing complexity of notice and consent requirements, it 
also allows for even more burdensome state regulation.  
 
113. Id. § 164.504. 
114. Id. § 164.506(a). 
115. Id. § 164.105(c)(2). 
116. Id. § 164.508(a)(1). 
117. See id. § 164.508(c). 
118. Id. § 164.508(a)(2)(iv). 
119. Id. § 164.510. 
120. Id. 
121. Id., at pt. 160, subpt. B. 
122. , supra note 24, at 187–88. 
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B. The Privacy Rule Applied to Health Research 
While the Privacy Rule and more stringent state laws aim to protect the 
privacy of patient health information, that protection threatens the viability of 
health research. Congress recognized the reality of this threat and the 
importance of personal information in health research. As a result, Congress 
signaled its intention that privacy protections not impede researcher access to 
that information. Two House reports on HIPAA contain identical language to 
this effect: ―As health [care] plans and providers continue to focus on outcomes 
research and innovation, it is important that the exchange and aggregated use of 
health care data be allowed.‖
123
 
HHS implemented Congress’ intent in the Privacy Rule by permitting the 
use of protected health information (PHI) for research if one of three conditions 
is met: (1) the PHI is deidentified; (2) the data subject provides explicit, written 
consent; or (3) an Institutional Review Board (IRB) or Privacy Board
124
 
provides consent.
125
 All three conditions have proven onerous, and in some 
cases impossible, to comply with in practice.  
1. Deidentification 
Under the Privacy Rule, deidentified PHI is ―not individually identifiable 
health information,‖ and therefore is not subject to the Rule’s restrictions.
126
 
Deidentification requires removing eighteen data elements, including not only 
obvious identifying information, such as name and contact information, but 
also all geographic subdivisions smaller than a state (except for the initial three 
digits of a ZIP Code in certain limited circumstances), all date elements other 
than year, and any biometric identifiers.
127
 (There is a variation on the 
exception for deidentified data for a ―limited data set‖ that has sixteen of the 
eighteen data elements required for true deidentification removed, but only if 
the researchers have executed a ―data use agreement‖ restricting the use of the 
data set.)
128
 
 
123.  104-736, at 265 (1996);  104-496, pt. 1, at 100 (1996).  
124. The Privacy Rule provides for the creation of Privacy Boards, which are created and 
operate similarly to IRBs, but exist for the sole purpose of reviewing requests for waivers of 
authorization for health research. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(B). 
125. See id. §§ 164.508(a)(1), 164.512(i), 164.514(a). 
126. Id. § 164.514(a). 
127. Id. § 164.514(b)(2)(i). 
128. Id. § 164.514(e)(2). A data use agreement between the covered entity and the limited 
data set recipient must:  
(A) Establish the permitted uses and disclosures of such information by the limited data 
set recipient, . . . ;  
(B) Establish who is permitted to use or receive the limited data set; and  
(C) Provide that the limited data set recipient will:  
(1) Not use or further disclose the information other than as permitted by the data 
use agreement or as otherwise required by law;  
(2) Use appropriate safeguards to prevent use or disclosure of the information 
other than as provided for by the data use agreement;  
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The deidentification provisions are useless for most medical research 
because researchers require access to information about the patient’s medical 
history, the time and date drugs were administered, or other data prohibited 
under the deidentification standard. Genetic research is impossible under this 
provision because genetic information is by definition a biometric identifier.
129
 
As a result, health researchers are required to obtain consent, either by 
approaching research subjects directly or by obtaining consent from an IRB or 
Privacy Board on their behalf.  
2. Individual Consent 
The Privacy Rule permits access to PHI for health research with the 
written authorization of each individual patient.
130
 This authorization is merely 
to access and use information; it is in addition to whatever other consent is 
required under applicable federal and state laws to participate in research 
involving human subjects.
131
 While the Privacy Rule may appear to be a 
reasonable compromise between privacy concerns and research needs, in 
practice the Rule and its reliance on individual consent impose significant 
burdens. Most significant among these burdens are: increased costs of research, 
introduction of selection bias, and limits on the types of studies that may 
feasibly be conducted. 
Under the Privacy Rule, authorization must be ―specific and 
meaningful‖
132
 and include a ―description of each purpose of the requested use 
or disclosure.‖
133
 HHS has determined that the authorization must be ―study-
specific.‖
134
 As such, authorization for ―future unspecified research‖ is 
prohibited.
135
 (In July 2010, HHS indicated that it was ―considering‖ modifying 
this requirement, although as a condition for doing so, it might require 
additional disclosures.)
136
 
 
(3) Report to the covered entity any use or disclosure of the information not 
provided for by its data use agreement of which it becomes aware;  
(4) Ensure that any agents, including a subcontractor, to whom it provides the 
limited data set agrees to the same restrictions and conditions that apply to the 
limited data set recipient with respect to such information; and  
(5) Not identify the information or contact the individuals.  
Id. § 164.514(e)(4). 
129. , ,
 19 (Mar. 10, 2008), 
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30006_20080310.pdf (―Individually identifiable 
health information is defined broadly and includes genetic information.‖). 
130. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1). 
131. See supra notes 97–109 and accompanying text. 
132. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)(i). 
133. Id. § 164.508(c)(1)(iv). 
134. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, supra note 111.  
135. Id. at 53,226.  
136. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules Under the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 40,868, 
40,894 (proposed July 14, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).  
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Obtaining individual consent is problematic for many of the reasons 
already identified, but it has proved especially difficult in the context of health 
research under the exacting requirements of the Privacy Rule. Consent is often 
easiest to obtain at time of admission to a hospital or when the patient is 
undergoing treatment, but this leads to obstacles with both practical and ethical 
dimensions.  
The person or entity managing the admission or treatment is rarely the 
same one who will conduct the research, so obtaining consent in advance may 
require one institution obtaining consent for the research of another. In 
addition, because the authorization to use personal data for research must be 
study-specific, it can only be obtained for studies that are already fully 
developed and have undergone IRB review (since the consent forms require 
IRB approval). Also, at time of admission to a hospital or during the treatment 
relationship, patients are often focused on their immediate health care needs 
and not particularly interested in addressing matters concerning unrelated uses 
of their health information. Obtaining consent is especially problematic when 
seeking data for control groups. For example, when a physician asks a healthy 
individual for permission to include his or her data in a cancer study, this often 
raises concerns that he or she is being diagnosed with cancer or is at risk for 
such a condition.
137
 Furthermore, there is a significant ethical question about 
whether it is appropriate to approach patients at time of admission or treatment 
seeking authorization to use personal data for a study unconnected to their care, 
or whether any authorization obtained under such stressful circumstances is 
ethically valid. 
The alternative to obtaining authorization at time of admission or during 
treatment is to seek it at a later date, but this is even more problematic. First, 
the patient must still be living, which is often not the case, especially when 
research involves life-threatening conditions. Furthermore, the patient must be 
located; with forty-five million Americans moving every year, this is easier 
said than done.
138
 Once located, they have to be contacted, which is both 
expensive and time-consuming. In-person contacts may yield higher consent 
rates than telephone or mail solicitations, but they are significantly more 
expensive and can be more burdensome to the individual. This is all necessary 
just to obtain patients’ permission to examine their medical records. For studies 
with more rigorous selection criteria, hundreds or even thousands of records 
must be examined just to find one person whose data are relevant.
139
 Because 
consent must be study-specific, this process must be undertaken separately for 
 
137. David Casarett et al., Bioethical Issues in Pharmacoepidemiologic Research, in 
 593 (Brian L. Strom ed., 4th ed. 2005). 
138. Addressing, , http://pe.usps.com/businessmail101/ 
addressing/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).  
139. See , GAO/HEHS-99-55, 
 14–15 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99055.pdf. 
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each research project. 
Further compounding the problem of expense is the chilling effect that 
requiring consent may have on participation rates. David Casarett, Jason 
Karlawish, Elizabeth Andrews, and Arthur Caplan have noted that 
if individuals must be contacted each time their records may be used in 
a particular study, the individual may consider such contact intrusive. 
Furthermore, individuals might consider that their confidentiality has 
been violated if researchers access research information and contact 
them directly in order to obtain consent for the use of de-identified 
records. Individuals may also refuse participation if contacted for a 
study they consider irrelevant to their health. An individual may also 
become alarmed if asked to consent for records to be used in such a 
study of a disease for which she has not been diagnosed. . . .
140
 
One 1999 study, conducted before the Privacy Rule took effect and 
therefore able to compare participation rates in research studies in states with 
different consent requirements, found that in states where research access to 
medical records did not require patient authorization, investigators were able to 
access 93 percent of the potential study population.
141
 But in states where 
consent was required, only 19 percent of the available population 
participated.
142
 
Moreover, the burdens imposed by the Privacy Rule have been clearly 
shown to introduce selection bias.
143
 Some large medical institutions with 
extensive treatment and research programs, such as the Mayo system, have 
proved successful in obtaining a high rate of consent.
144
 But even there, the 20 
percent of people who refuse to consent—or to make a decision of any form—
exhibit distinct demographic and health characteristics that are statistically 
capable of skewing the research base.
145
 Jack V. Tu et al. found that requiring 
consent before adding patient data to the Registry of the Canadian Stroke 
Network created a database that was ―not representative.‖
146
 David Armstrong 
et al. compared patients who consented to their data being added to the Acute 
Coronary Syndrome Registry before the enactment of HIPAA (when consent 
could be obtained by telephone) and post-HIPAA (when consent had to be in 
writing) and found that 
 
140. Casarett et al., supra note 137, at 593. 
141. Douglas B. McCarthy et al., Medical Records and Privacy: Empirical Effects of 
Legislation, 34 . 417 (1999). 
142. Id. 
143. , supra note 24, at 210–14. 
144. See Steven J. Jacobsen et al., Potential Effect of Authorization Bias on Medical 
Record Research, 74  330 (1999).  
145. Id. 
146. , supra note 24, at 210 (referring to Jack V. Tu et 
al., Impracticability of Informed Consent in the Registry of the Canadian Stroke Network, 350 
 1414 (2004)). 
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[p]atients who gave consent post-HIPAA were more likely to be older, 
married, and white than those who refused to provide consent or did 
not respond. Patients who gave consent also had lower mortality rates 
at 6 months than patients who refused consent. The results suggest that 
implementation of the Privacy Rule led to selection bias in the 
Registry.
147
 
David Casarett et al. noted that even when the refusal rate was as low as 
3.2 percent, ―the persons declining consent varied from the study population by 
age, gender, residence, and prior diagnoses, suggesting that the ability to opt 
out of databases creates a potential bias in the data.‖
148
 
The Privacy Rule’s requirement that authorizations for the use or 
disclosure of PHI include ―[a] description of each purpose of the requested use 
or disclosure‖ serves to exacerbate the problems associated with consent and 
may hinder certain types of data-based research.
149
 As noted, in the August 
2002 final rule, HHS commented that research-related purposes described in 
the authorization must be ―study-specific‖ and that authorizations for ―future 
unspecified research‖ would be considered overly broad and invalid.
150
 Yet 
many research uses of health information—for example, for registries and 
retrospective studies (described in Part II.A above)—are designed to facilitate 
unforeseen research studies. They provide an efficient, cost-effective tool for 
conducting research, testing hypotheses, looking for heretofor undiscovered 
correlations—none of which will be known at the time an individual permits 
his or her heath data to be added.
151
 The study-specific requirement of the 
Privacy Rule undermines many of the benefits of data-based research and 
greatly adds to its cost, since consent must be obtained from each individual for 
each study. The requirement also restricts tissue banking and other forward-
looking genetic research models.
152
 
The announcement from HHS in July 2010 that it is ―considering‖ 
modifying the study-specific consent requirement is welcome news.
153
 
Concerns remain, however, about the fact that the department is only 
―considering‖ such a change at this point, and that it has indicated it might 
require additional disclosures for research involving ―genetic analyses or 
mental health research‖ as a condition of such a change—thus adding to the 
 
147. Id. at 213 (referring to David Armstrong et al., Potential Impact of the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule on Data Collection in a Registry of Patients with Acute Coronary Syndrome, 165 
 1125 (2005)). 
148. Casarett et al., supra note 119, at 594. 
149. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)(iv) (2009). 
150. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, supra note 111, 
at 53,226.  
151. See supra notes 61–87 and accompanying text. 
152. , supra note 24, at 164, 208–09, 287. 
153. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules Under the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 40,868, 
40,894 (proposed July 14, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164).  
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mound of legal disclosures that few individuals read.
154
 These terms are ill-
defined and could lead to confusion, especially since even characteristics such 
as ―gender‖ are determined genetically, so that research to determine if a 
condition disproportionately affects women could be considered ―genetic 
analyses‖ and would require additional stipulations in the authorization 
document.  
The burden on research imposed by the Privacy Rule is in addition to that 
imposed by the Common Rule, which applies to all federally funded research 
involving human subjects.
155
 Because the consent requirements of the Common 
Rule and the Privacy Rule differ in significant ways, researchers are likely to 
face overlapping or redundant requirements. For example, the rules define PHI 
and deidentification differently.
156
 Under the Common Rule, researchers are 
permitted to collect data, as well as biological samples from which data are 
derived, for unspecified future uses, ―as long as any unintended use is described 
in sufficient detail to allow informed consent‖;
157
 the Privacy Rule forbids 
this.
158
 And the Common Rule takes a far more permissive view towards 
deidentification, requiring only that the ―the identity of the subject may not be 
readily ascertained by the health researcher,‖ while the HIPAA Privacy Rule is 
much more restrictive.
159
 
These and other inconsistencies between the Privacy Rule and the 
Common Rule further complicate the conduct of health research, increase its 
costs, and introduce considerable uncertainty into health research. Yet the 
overlap and inconsistency between the two rules affords individuals with no 
greater privacy protection. 
In sum, the Privacy Rule’s individual consent provisions as applicable to 
research have not proved to be workable or desirable in many settings. They 
raise ethical concerns for patients and severely hinder medical research by 
imposing additional costs, introducing selection biases, and imposing 
limitations on the types of research that may be conducted. 
3. IRB Substituted Consent 
The alternative to individual authorization for the use of personal 
information in health research is to persuade an IRB or Privacy Board to 
substitute its consent for that of the data subject.
160
 The Privacy Rule permits an 
IRB or Privacy Board to waive the need for individual authorization only if 
three conditions are met: (1) the use or disclosure of protected health 
 
154. Id.   
155. 45 C.F.R. pt. 46.  
156. See id. § 46.102(f)(2).  
157. , supra note 24, at 45. 
158. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508(c)(1), 164.514(b).  
159. See id. § 46.102(f)(2).  
160. Id. § 164.512(i)(1)(i). 
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information involves no more than ―minimal risk‖ to the privacy of individuals; 
(2) the ―research could not practicably be conducted‖ without the waiver or 
alteration; and (3) the ―research could not practicably be conducted without 
access to and use of the protected health information.‖
161
 While two of these 
conditions concern ―practicability,‖ the Privacy Rule does not define this term 
and offers ―no guidance as to what factors (e.g., feasibility or cost) should be 
considered in determining whether the criteria are met.‖
162
 
The third requirement regarding ―minimal risk‖ is similarly ambiguous 
and problematic.
163
 ―Minimal risk,‖ as we have already seen in the context of 
the Common Rule, means that ―the probability and magnitude of harm or 
discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than 
those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine 
physical or psychological examinations or tests.‖
164
 It is difficult to determine 
what this means when applied to personal information, precisely because the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule requires individual consent even in situations in which no 
―harm or discomfort‖ is threatened.
165
 In addition, the Privacy Rule identifies 
three elements that must be in place to satisfy the ―minimal risk‖ requirement. 
The first of these is an ―adequate plan to protect the identifiers from improper 
use and disclosure.‖
166
 The second required element is an ―adequate plan to 
destroy the identifiers at the earliest opportunity consistent with conduct of the 
research, unless there is a health or research justification for retaining the 
identifiers or such retention is otherwise required by law.‖
167
 The final required 
element is ―[a]dequate written assurances that the protected health information 
will not be reused or disclosed to any other person or entity.‖
168
 
In sum, IRBs are charged by law with two primary tasks: balancing the 
potential benefits of proposed research with the risk to the research subject, and 
ensuring that the researchers obtain the informed consent of the research 
subjects. Their members bring their diverse and professional judgment to 
ensure both that the benefits and risks are adequately described to the research 
subject and that the request being made to the data subject is objectively 
reasonable. Unlike most privacy laws, under the Common Rule, consent is only 
an answer if the question being asked is reasonable. Yet Casarett et al. have 
noted, ―[t]he risks to the subjects of epidemiology research are not the usual 
health risks of research that can be balanced against the potential health 
benefits of research.‖
169
 Instead, ―the chief risk is a violation of confidentiality, 
 
161. Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii). 
162. , supra note 24, at 169. 
163. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(A). 
164. Id. § 46.102(i). 
165. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a).  
166. Id. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(A). 
167. Id.  
168. Id.  
169. Casarett et al., supra note 137, at 597. 
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which is really a civil, rather than a medical, risk.‖
170
 And often those are risks 
that IRBs are neither familiar nor experienced with resolving.  
The Privacy Rule prohibits the use of personal health data for research 
unless one of three conditions is met. The first is deidentification, which makes 
the data useless for the vast majority of research.
171
 The second is individual 
consent, which is often time-consuming and expensive, burdensome to 
individuals, ethically questionable, and runs the risk of introducing selection 
bias if even a small percentage of the population declines.
172
 Moreover, 
because of restrictive HHS interpretations and unlike the requirements of the 
Common Rule, consent is unavailing for future unspecified research, as is often 
the case with data-based research. Researchers are therefore left with the third 
option: IRB substituted consent—the alternative with the greatest flexibility, 
but one that challenges the capabilities of most IRBs.
173
 As a result, the 
overarching effect of the Privacy Rule is to impose a substantial burden on 
data-based health research and provide problematically weak protection of 
personal health information. 
IV. 
THE IMPACT OF CHOICE ON HEALTH RESEARCH AND PRIVACY 
The Privacy Rule imposes a considerable burden on health research in 
large part because of its reliance on individual choice. Unless personal health 
information is completely deidentified, which makes it useless for the vast 
majority of health research, it can only be used with the explicit consent of the 
individual or with the substituted consent of an IRB.  
In 2007, the IOM convened a Committee on Health Research and the 
Privacy of Health Information, which issued its final report in February 
2009.
174
 After documenting many of the issues outlined above, the committee 
reached two broad conclusions: ―the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not protect 
privacy as well as it should‖ and ―as currently implemented, the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule impedes important health research.‖
175
 In reaching these 
conclusions, the IOM committee reflected similar conclusions reached by 
earlier studies.
176
 To take just one example, in 2003 the Association of 
American Medical Colleges created a database of experiences with HIPAA and 
reported the ―most common effects of the Privacy Rule on health research‖ to 
be: 
(1) reduced patient recruitment, (2) increased the likelihood of 
 
170. Id. 
171. See supra notes 126–128 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra notes 131–159 and accompanying text. 
173. See supra notes 160–168 and accompanying text. 
174. , supra note 24, at 67–70. 
175. Id. at 2. 
176. Id. at 199–209. 
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selection bias, (3) increased the costs of conducting research by 
requiring more paperwork and complicating the IRB approval process, 
(4) increased the number of errors in research when deidentified 
information was used, (5) made multisite trials more difficult because 
of variations in IRB interpretation of the Rule, and (6) caused 
researchers to abandon projects because of the increased number of 
rules for operating a research study.
177
  
The IOM committee documented serious problems created by the Privacy 
Rule’s consent requirements, including difficulties with recruiting participants, 
selection bias, cost and efficiency, and inter-institutional collaboration.
178
 
Ultimately, the committee concluded that consent requirements not only make 
health research more expensive, less efficient, and less accurate, but also that 
potentially important research studies are actually abandoned.
179
 While the 
burden placed on health research by the Privacy Rule is considerable today, it 
will only become more acute as the use of EHRs, PHRs, and other data expands 
and research becomes even more information-based and more 
individualized.
180
  
More importantly, the burdens imposed by the Privacy Rule’s consent 
requirement on medical research do not advance privacy. As the IOM panel 
wrote: ―consent (authorization) itself cannot achieve the separate aim of 
privacy protection.‖
181
 The committee’s reasoning is clear and stark: the 
―obligations to safeguard privacy, such as security, transparency, and 
accountability, are independent of patient consent. In fact, preventing the 
secondary use of personal data is the only privacy obligation that consent can 
potentially address.‖
182
 
The Privacy Rule’s reliance on consent, far from being justified on any 
ethical basis, actually poses significant ethical issues. For example, by relying 
on patient authorization for the use of data in health research, we ignore the fact 
that ―few patients are sufficiently informed to make educated decisions about 
how their data should be used.‖
183
 Similarly, we are presenting choices to 
patients knowing that ―many consumers do not read the details of informed 
consent forms‖ and that ―even when they do read the forms, they often do not 
comprehend all the details.‖
184
 The Privacy Rule ignores the strong evidence 
that ―many consumers mistake the existence of any privacy policy for a 
 
177. Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality, National Comm. on Vital and Health 
Statistics (Nov. 19, 2003) (testimony of Susan Ehringhaus, Associate General Counsel for the 
Association of American Medical Colleges).  
178. See , supra note 24, at 209–30. 
179. Id. 
180. See id. at 254. 
181. Id. at 250.  
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 251. 
184. Id. 
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guarantee that information will be strongly protected and withheld from outside 
persons, even if the consent says differently.‖
185
 Moreover, the rule causes us to 
ask patients to ―give informed consent at a time when they are not in good 
health and are not motivated or lack the ability to make these kinds of 
complicated decisions.‖
186
  
Consent requirements not only impede health research, but may actually 
undermine privacy interests. As discussed in Part III.B.2, ―if individuals must 
be contacted each time their records may be used in a particular study in order 
to obtain informed consent, as the Privacy Rule requires, such contact could be 
considered intrusive and counter to the tenets of confidentiality.‖
187
 The 
challenge is especially great when individuals are asked to have their data 
included in a study as part of the control sample—i.e., data about people who 
do not have the condition that is being studied.  
There is a still stronger ethical objection to the Privacy Rule’s reliance on 
consent for examining personal information in health research. Helena Gail 
Rubinstein, a former Director of Policy Analysis and Program Development in the 
Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission, has written that ―while autonomy is 
an appropriate framework for evaluating questions concerning the treatment of one’s 
body, it is not the appropriate framework for evaluating rules to regulate the use of 
health data.‖
188
 Ms. Rubinstein further stated that relying on consent refuses to 
recognize, ―in exchange for the vast improvements in medical care, a correlative 
responsibility on the part of the individual, as a potential consumer of health care 
services, toward the community.‖ She concluded: ―As individuals rely on their right 
to be let alone, they shift the burden . . . for providing the data needed to advance 
medical and health policy information. Their individualist vision threatens the entire 
community.‖
189
 
Ironically, it may be questionable to speak of ―their individualist vision,‖ 
because this vision is largely the creation of regulators at HHS, not of research 
subjects. Polling data show public support for the responsible use of personal data 
for health research, subject to appropriate deidentification, transparency 
requirements, and strong legal oversight.
190
 
Moreover, the insistence on choice is itself a choice. The Privacy Rule 
provides for no individual choice concerning uses of personal information that HHS 
believes are so important as to outweigh privacy concerns. Nonconsensual 
 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 252. 
188. Helena Gail Rubinstein, If I Am Only for Myself, What Am I? A Communitarian Look at the 
Privacy Stalemate, 25  203, 223 (1999). 
189. Id. at 226. 
190. See, e.g., David M. Haas et al., Patient Attitudes Toward Genotyping in an Urban 
Women’s Health Clinic, 112  1023 (2008); Paul R. Helft et al., 
Cancer Patients’ Attitudes Toward Future Research Uses of Stored Human Biological Materials, 
2  15 (2007). 
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disclosures of health information are permitted for public health activities; to report 
victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence; in judicial and administrative 
proceedings with a court order, subpoena, or discovery request; to enable product 
recalls, repairs, or replacement; to facilitate organ and tissue transplantation; and for 
law enforcement activities with a warrant, a subpoena, an administrative request, an 
investigative demand, or even a law enforcement official’s request.
191
 In these 
settings, there are no meaningful limits on subsequent use, no anonymization 
requirements, no security standards, and no provisions for oversight. It is unclear by 
what ethical principle HHS determined that consent was not required for these uses, 
but was necessary for the use of personal data in health research. 
V. 
WAYS FORWARD 
There are many positive steps that could reduce the burden on health research 
created by the Privacy Rule’s insistence on choice—whether supplied by the 
individual or substituted by an IRB. Some approaches would simply make choice 
work better, while others would diminish the role of choice altogether. 
To help make choice work more effectively, for example, regulators could 
amend the Privacy Rule to bring its requirements into line with those of the 
Common Rule concerning the definition of PHI,
192
 the meaning of 
deidentification,
193
 and the scope of consent.
194
 This would at least eliminate 
the inconsistency that presently imposes additional costs and delays on health 
researchers without providing any additional benefits to individuals. A second 
useful approach would be to expand the scope of consent so that individuals could 
consent to unspecified future uses of health data.
195
 The current prohibition on broad 
consent is found neither in HIPAA nor the Privacy Rule, but rather is an 
interpretation by the HHS Office of Civil Rights.
196
 The burden of that interpretation 
grows more acute as genetic and large-scale, data-based research expands. HHS 
could go beyond ―considering‖ reversing this restrictive interpretation, to explicitly 
permitting authorizations for unspecified future research, consistent with the 
Common Rule.  
Choice could also be made to work better by revising the definition of 
―deidentified,‖
197
 so that personal data would not be subject to the Privacy Rule if 
immediately identifying information (e.g., name, address, Social Security Number) 
had been removed, and the researcher was prohibited from reidentifying or 
 
191. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2009).  
192. See id. §§ 164.508, 164.514(b). 
193. Id. § 46.102(f)(2).  
194. , supra note 24, at 45; see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 
164.508, 164.514(b). 
195. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.508, 164.514(b). 
196. 67 Fed. Reg. 53181, 53226. 
197. See id. § 164.514(b)(2)(i). 
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attempting to identify the data subject, except as required by law. This is a more 
workable approach to deidentification than the Privacy Rule’s current approach, 
which requires removing so much information as to make the underlying data 
useless for most research purposes. Moreover, it reflects the reality that, in the face 
of modern digital technologies, no personal information is ever truly deidentified if it 
is to retain value for researchers.
198
  
A fourth approach would be to move to a more proportional, risk-based 
concept of consent, so that explicit, written consent is only necessary where 
serious harm is threatened; other uses of personal data might be permitted with 
oral consent or even opt-out consent.
199
 This would introduce a commonsense 
proportionality by imposing greater impediments only when greater perceived 
risks warrant them. 
These and similar approaches help reduce the burden imposed by choice on 
health research and may help make choice more meaningful, but they do little to 
address the ethical issues raised by requiring choice, in any form, for the use of 
personal information in health research. Other approaches would diminish the role 
of individual choice altogether, either by eliminating it entirely in certain 
circumstances or by creating workable alternatives. Four options appear particularly 
promising. 
The first option is to add IRB-approved health research to the long list of 
uses of PHI for which the Privacy Rule does not require individual consent. 
There is ample reason to think that most health research has as much, or even 
broader, social utility as public health reporting or complying with subpoenas 
or administrative demands.
200
 This approach offers the advantage of fitting 
easily within the existing structure of the Privacy Rule. It might, however, be 
criticized as providing too little privacy protection since the Privacy Rule 
effectively exempts from further direct regulation its long list of uses of PHI 
that do not require consent.  
A second approach would be for HHS and other federal regulators to 
eliminate the Privacy Rule’s consent requirement for use of PHI in health 
research, but expand the Common Rule to apply to all research involving 
human subjects, irrespective of the funding source. Because of the terms of 
many institutions’ Federalwide Assurances,
201
 such an extension may merely 
codify existing practice. This approach would avoid unnecessary regulatory 
duplication and inconsistency, but it would require amending not only the 
Privacy Rule, but also the Common Rule.  
 
198. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization, 57  1701 (2010).  
199. Proportionality is a key concept under the Common Rule and in other nations’ privacy 
laws. See Casarett et al., supra note 137, at 597; , supra note 
24, at 263. 
200. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512.  
201. See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text. 
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The third alternative would be for personal information to be provided to 
―licensed‖ or ―registered‖ research facilities without any individual consent, but 
subject to strict privacy protections. These protections might include strong 
security requirements, prohibitions on reidentifying information from which 
name or address had been removed, and effective oversight and enforcement 
provisions (such as regular privacy audits). These facilities would be restricted 
by law or contract from using health data provided without individual consent 
for any research that had not received IRB approval and/or other guarantees of 
the research’s likely social value. This would require substantial new 
regulation, but that would offer the benefit of clear, specific privacy rules 
applicable to the research setting.  
Finally, personal information could be deposited in ―licensed‖ or 
―registered‖ data centers, where they could be accessed for meritorious, IRB-
approved research without any individual consent. The data centers would be 
subject to strict requirements and oversight, as described above, and would 
provide data to ―accredited‖ research institutions subject to similar conditions. 
Ontario, Canada, follows a similar approach in its Personal Health Information 
Protection Act.
202
 Richard Thomas, former Information Privacy Commissioner 
of the United Kingdom, and Mark Walport also recommended a similar 
approach to the Prime Minister in 2008.
203
 As with the prior approach, new 
regulations would be necessary, but this alternative offers potentially greater 
data protection by limiting the distribution of PHI. One useful model in U.S. 
law is the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which imposes strict requirements on 
―Consumer Reporting Agencies,‖ which are then allowed to collect consumer 
financial data without individual consent, but can only provide them to end 
users for ―permissible purposes‖ and subject to important restrictions on their 
disclosure and use.
204
  
The goal here is not to propose a specific solution to the significant problems 
created by the consent requirements of the Privacy Rule, but rather to demonstrate 
that there are alternatives that would enhance both health research and personal 
privacy. In addition, it is critical to recognize that there is no ethical requirement for 
individual consent (or substituted IRB consent) before personal information is used 
for health research. Unlike the situation in which research is conducted on the 
person, in which case modern ethics and U.S. law would virtually always require the 
consent of the individual, the use of personal data presents a different situation 
governed by different ethical norms. As discussed above, those norms require 
 
202. Personal Health Information Protection Act, S.O. 2004, c.3, schedule A (Can.), available at 
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_04p03_e.htm; see also 
, 
(2004), available at http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/hguide-e.pdf (explaining the operation of the 
Ontario health privacy law). 
203. ,  70–71 (2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/reviews/docs/data-sharing-review-report.pdf. 
204. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).  
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considering not only the potential benefits to individuals and society if health data 
are used—versus the potential harm to the individual if they are not—but also the 
wide range of issues surrounding the consent process, the extent to which consent is 
even practical, the burden on individuals of requesting consent, the effect on the 
whole data set of even a few individuals declining consent, and the cost in economic 
and human terms of requiring consent. Those norms also require considering the 
range of tools for reducing the risk associated with the use of health data—for 
example, by requiring the removal of names or other readily identifying information, 
or enacting strong legal protections against reidentifying or reusing health data—and 
evaluating the extent to which requiring consent actually protects privacy more 
effectively than these and other regulatory and technological tools. Finally, those 
norms might also be considered in the context of the numerous other purposes for 
which federal law permits health data to be used without consent.  
Even if an ethical imperative for consent to the use of personal data did exist, it 
would not be absolute. Instead, as The Belmont Report itself recognized, ―to 
repudiate [a] person’s considered judgments, to deny an individual the freedom to 
act on those considered judgments, or to withhold information necessary to make a 
considered judgment,‖ only shows ―lack of respect for an autonomous agent‖ and 
would therefore be ethically impermissible if ―there are no compelling reasons to do 
so.‖
205
 This is presumably the logic that undergirded HHS’s decision to exempt so 
many uses of health information from the Privacy Rule.
206
 The converse of this 
principle is true as well. Where a compelling reason to act exists, the decision to wait 
for consent poses ethical issues. These issues are exacerbated where the benefits to 
society of using the data are great, as they often are with health research, and where 
the potential harms to individual data subjects are slight, as they would be in the case 
of anonymized information being used subject to strong security and nondisclosure 
protections. 
What seems inescapably clear is that the Privacy Rule’s requirement of 
consent cannot be ethically justified on the basis that it protects privacy because, as 
shown, consent does not equate with privacy. One clear advantage of moving away 
from a consent-based approach is that it would highlight the urgency of assuring that 
the law provides the appropriate incentives to ensure that personal privacy is 
protected.  
CONCLUSION 
Data protection laws today often regard individual choice as both a tool 
for protecting privacy and, in some cases, the objective of those laws. This is a 
serious error in part because choice is rarely effective in protecting privacy, and 
will only become less so as new technologies and applications increase the 
supply of, and the demand for, personal information. But it is also a mistake 
 
205. , supra note 92, at 4.  
206. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2009).  
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because maximizing individual choice is not the same thing as protecting 
privacy. Laws that confuse the two not only fail to protect privacy, but also 
frequently undermine other important activities and values as well.  
This is clearly the case for health research that uses personal data, which 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires be conducted either with completely 
deidentified—and therefore generally useless—data, or with consent provided 
either by individual data subjects or an IRB (or Privacy Board). The result has 
been a failure to protect individual privacy adequately and a significant 
impediment to research that could save or dramatically enhance human life. 
Many of the reasons for these twin failures are practical, and have to do with 
the difficulty and cost of obtaining consent at any time, as well as the 
duplication and inconsistency between the Privacy Rule and the Common Rule. 
But there are also substantial conceptual and ethical objections to relying so 
heavily on individual choice for access to data for health research.  
Autonomy and informed consent are vital ethical and legal principles 
undergirding the U.S. approach to health care and to health research that 
involves experimentation on human subjects. But these principles are 
implicated less strongly, if at all, by data-based health research—research that 
is becoming more common and more important as more patient data is captured 
and stored electronically and as the search for personalized therapies increases 
the volume of data necessary for effective research. In short, there is no ethical 
principle that requires choice as the basis for research involving patient data, 
especially if identifying information is masked and the use of the data is subject 
to strong, substantive security and privacy requirements. Regulatory insistence 
on choice is quite literally allowing people to die and suffer unnecessarily without 
even providing the benefit of aiding privacy. 
While the burden of choice and its inadequacy for protecting privacy is 
especially clear in the case of health research, the conclusion applies in other areas 
as well. Individual choice does not protect privacy in financial transactions, online 
commerce, or other settings any better than it does in health care. Instead, protecting 
privacy requires a broad range of tools, such as the eight principles included in the 
OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data,
207
 which are the basis for almost all of the national and regional 
 
207. , supra note 2. The 
eight principles are: 
1. Collection Limitation Principle—There should be limits to the collection of 
personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means 
and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject. 
2. Data Quality Principle—Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for 
which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, 
should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date. 
3. Purpose Specification Principle—The purposes for which personal data are 
collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and 
the subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others 
as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each 
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privacy regimes that have been adopted since 1980.
208
 The valuable activities 
impeded by choice are not limited to health research.  
Recognizing the limits of choice, and notice to facilitate it, does not mean 
that notice and choice play no role in protecting privacy—in health research or 
any other setting. Notice can help facilitate transparency, which is critical if the 
public is to support and fund health research. Similarly, choice grows more 
appropriate as real harms are threatened or in situations where there are 
meaningful decisions to be made. But it is time we recognize that in most 
settings, choice is neither the best tool for protecting our privacy nor an 
appropriate goal of our privacy laws.  
 
occasion of change of purpose. 
4. Use Limitation Principle—Personal data should not be disclosed, made 
available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in 
accordance with [the Purpose Specification Principle] except: (a) with the 
consent of the data subject; or (b) by the authority of law. 
5. Security Safeguards Principle—Personal data should be protected by reasonable 
security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, 
destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data. 
6. Openness Principle—There should be a general policy of openness about 
developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means 
should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of 
personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and 
usual residence of the data controller. 
7. Individual Participation Principle—An individual should have the right: (a) to 
obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not 
the data controller has data relating to him; (b) to have communicated to him, 
data relating to him within a reasonable time; at a charge, if any, that is not 
excessive; in a reasonable manner; and in a form that is readily intelligible to 
him; (c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and 
(b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and (d) to challenge 
data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful to have the data erased, 
rectified, completed or amended. 
8. Accountability Principle—A data controller should be accountable for 
complying with measures which give effect to the principles stated above. 
Id. at 14–16. 
208. See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46, supra note 3; , supra 
note 13; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, supra note 7. 
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